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Perils of the Reverse Silver Platter Under
U.S. Border Patrol Operations
D. Anthony*
16 U. MASS. L. REV 232

ABSTRACT
In the face of expanding U.S. Border Patrol operations across the country, that agency
often acquires evidence during its searches that is unrelated to immigration or other
federal crimes but may involve state crimes. States are then faced with the question of
whether to accept such evidence for state prosecutions when it was lawfully obtained
by federal agents consistent with federal law but in violation of the state’s own search
and seizure provisions. Sometimes referred to as “reverse silver platter” evidence,
states have come to widely varying conclusions as to the admissibility of federallyobtained evidence that would clearly have been inadmissible had it been obtained by
state actors. This Article explores the approaches and rationales employed by states on
this question and the legal implications thereof, particularly in light of sometimes
constitutionally dubious Border Patrol activities, the “border search exception” to the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the broader significance of states
choosing to sacrifice their own constitutional principles and rights of their citizens in
the interest of prosecutorial convenience.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2017, the United States Border Patrol set up a vehicle
checkpoint in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Ostensibly, the primary
purpose for the checkpoint was border enforcement, but part of that
border enforcement process involved drug detection dogs. Aware that
the federal government had no intention of prosecuting low-level drug
crimes and that its own charge was border security, Border Patrol
collaborated with local law enforcement prior to and during the
checkpoint stops. This collaboration ensured local police were present
at the checkpoint and could be provided with any drug evidence
obtained, allowing for state charges to be brought against those who had
drugs confiscated as a result of the federal searches.1 The problem was
that Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the use of drug detection dogs
without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing violated that protection.2
In the resulting legal challenge brought by the individuals charged with
drug crimes based on evidence found during the searches, the state
claimed that state civil liberties do not constrain federal authorities
acting within its boundaries, no state action was involved in the
checkpoint, and that state prosecutors were free to use the evidence
obtained by federal authorities and provided to state law enforcement
who were present.3 The defendants argued that this amounted to an
illegal end-run around state law; had the state done what Border Patrol
did, the evidence obtained would have been clearly inadmissible.4 They
claimed that acting in concert with federal authorities does not cure that
illegality, so the evidence should be excluded.5
This scenario raises the question of how a state court can, and
should, deal with the admissibility of evidence obtained by a federal
official consistent with federal law, but in violation of state law. This
Article will explore the legal implications of a case such as this,
including the overlap of federal and state authority and the sometimesblurred boundaries of each within the context of federalism. It will
investigate the increasingly expansive activities of Border Patrol, the
1

2
3
4
5

State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, 2018 WL 2106769, at *1–2 (N.H.
Super. May 1, 2018).
Id. at *3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIX.
McCarthy, 2018 WL 2106769, at *2.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
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“border search exception” to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and the conflicts with state civil liberties provisions when
the exception leads to evidence in state prosecutions generally
impermissible under state law. The analysis of appropriate boundaries
and limits of law enforcement activities in this context will be informed
by legal provisions, constitutional jurisprudence, and practical
considerations. Whether Border Patrol may collaborate with state or
local law enforcement using methods that violate state—but not
federal—constitutional rights is an increasingly relevant question, as is
whether Border Patrol may deliver evidence to the state in the absence
of collaboration. Several state courts have refused to accept this
evidence, concluding that such cooperation is not legally permissible,
while others have gone further by holding that any evidence obtained
by federal agencies in violation of state constitutional rights will be
excluded from state courts. As this Article will demonstrate, the
arguments for rejecting such evidence are convincing.
I. THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Until nearly the middle of the 20th Century, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence applied only to the federal government and not to the
states.6 In practice, this meant that while state law enforcement could
take action that violated both the letter of the Amendment and federal
court interpretations of it, federal law enforcement action was bound by
both. However, this divergence led to an important question: what
would happen if state law enforcement acted in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but then handed the resulting evidence over to federal
officers to use in federal prosecutions, where the evidence would have
otherwise been inadmissible if federal agents had procured it? The
federal government did put forth such stat-gathered evidence, and the
federal courts continuously admitted it.7
In 1949 the Supreme Court officially endorsed the “silver platter
doctrine” in Lustig v. United States.8 The doctrine was so named
because state officials were said to hand over evidence to federal
authorities on a figurative silver platter, allowing federal law
enforcement to use the evidence that was obtained by states in a
6

7
8

In Wolf v. Colorado the Supreme Court expressly held that the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution was “enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause.” 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388 (1914).
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949).
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federally unconstitutional manner.9 So long as the federal authorities
had no hand in securing the evidence, they could use it as they wished.
For the next decade, the silver platter doctrine was applied by federal
courts to circumvent the Fourth Amendment, as it did not yet apply to
state actors. The doctrine’s official acceptance, however, was shortlived. Eleven years later, the Court overturned the silver platter doctrine
in Elkins v. United States, holding that evidence that would have been
inadmissible had the search been conducted by federal officials is also
inadmissible when provided by state officers for use in a federal trial.10
Such a practice, the Court decided, violates the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.11
Just a year later, the question became partially moot. The
exclusionary rule has applied to the federal government since 1914.12
The rule dictated that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth
Amendment protections was not admissible in court, under the theory
that the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures would be
meaningless if the evidence obtained illegally were nevertheless
admissible.13 However, the exclusionary rule applied only to the federal
government; state law enforcement operated under no such restrictions.
While the Court determined that Fourth Amendment protections also
apply to state actions in Wolf v. Colorado, it declined to acknowledge
the exclusionary rule as essential to safeguard the rights guaranteed
under the Amendment.14 That finally changed in 1961 with Mapp v.
Ohio, where the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the
states.15 Consequently, both the federal government and the states
operated under identical Fourth Amendment restrictions and remedies
after 1961; any evidence illegally obtained by a state would be
inadmissible in either court system. Thus, the silver platter doctrine
became partially irrelevant because there could be no circumstance
under which law enforcement actions would violate the Fourth

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208, 223 (1960).
Id. at 223.
E.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 393.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28, 33 (1949).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961).
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Amendment yet remain permissible by state actors. Evidence obtained
from an illegal search would be inadmissible in either court system.16
II. REVERSE SILVER PLATTER
The “reverse silver platter” is the analogue of the silver platter issue
but working in the opposite direction. It involves a situation wherein
federal law enforcement acts in a way that is consistent with federal
constitutional requirements but violates state constitutional protections.
16

While a full examination of it is outside of the scope of this Article, a different
kind of silver platter case persists. Occasionally there are cases where evidence
obtained by state actors in violation of state law, but consistent with federal law,
is then provided to federal authorities for prosecution. Federal courts have held
that evidence gathered in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal
court, even if obtained by state authorities under a state warrant in violation of
state law. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (holding
that evidence obtained by state actors in violation of the Fourth Amendment
would be inadmissible in federal court); United States v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d
765, 770–71 (1st Cir. 1991) (while a federal court may choose to exercise its
discretion in excluding ill-gotten evidence the general rule is that evidence
gathered in compliance with the Fourth Amendment will be admissible in a
federal proceeding); United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1485 n.7 (1st Cir.
1989) (“Federal law governs the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials, even when it is obtained pursuant to a state search warrant or in the course
of a state investigation.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Sheehan, 406 F.
Supp. 3d 178, 180 (D. Mass. 2019) (“evidence gathered under a state warrant is
admitted in federal proceedings if the warrant substantially complies with federal
law”). In other words, patent illegality in the gathering of the evidence would not
necessarily require exclusion of the evidence in federal court. Even a state court
order to suppress the same evidence in state court based on state law (or the state
court’s interpretation of federal law) would not render the evidence inadmissible
in federal court. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008); United
States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2000). Interestingly, the reverse
scenario leads to the opposite result: a federal agent who obtained evidence
illegally under federal law was enjoined from testifying in a state court
prosecution concerning the illegally obtained evidence. Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214, 217 (1956). This doctrine is controversial. It arguably incentivizes state
and local law enforcement to ignore the protections states provide their citizens
and federal law enforcement to encourage these state actors to do so. This
potentially abrogates the very protections that state legislatures intended to
provide and allows for the circumvention of otherwise applicable protections. The
issue could be framed in this way: as a requirement for evidence to be admissible
in their courts, federal courts require it be obtained consistent with federal law,
regardless of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it was obtained. States can, and
should, do the same by holding that to be admissible in state courts, evidence must
have been obtained consistent with state law.
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State officials—in a state prosecution—would then proffer evidence
they received on a “silver platter” from federal officials, which would
have been inadmissible had it been obtained by state officials due to the
violation of state constitutional provisions. A “reverse silver platter
doctrine” would hold that the gathering of evidence by federal actors
that was illegal under the state constitution would not require the
evidence to be excluded in the state trial.
While the reverse silver platter issue is relevant to a number of
federal agencies, it is particularly salient with Border Patrol. Courts
have construed the Fourth Amendment to allow the Border Patrol to
operate under reduced restrictions, which permit the agency to conduct
searches without a warrant and with little suspicion of wrongdoing
under circumstances which other federal agencies may not.17 The
justification for such allowance is to permit the agency to carry out its
important charge of immigration and customs enforcement at the
border.18 Yet Border Patrol operations do not take place exclusively at
the border—they actually extend far inside the U.S. and have become
increasingly expansive in recent years.19 Given the reduced
constitutional protections and a lower required standard of suspicion,
searches conducted by Border Patrol agents frequently yield evidence
of crimes unrelated to immigration violations. This evidence often
would not have been obtained had ordinary search and seizure standards
17

18
19

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973). The
constitutional leeway given to Border Patrol is controversial. See, e.g., id.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that exceptions to the warrant
requirement apply to Border Patrol operations. See id. at 274–75 (quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)).
Id. at 272.
Daniel E. Martínez et al., Border Enforcement Developments Since 1993 and How
to Change CPB, CTR FOR MIGRATION STUD. N.Y. (Aug. 24, 2020),
http://doi.org/10.14240/cmsesy082420 [https://perma.cc/Y2MD-NFY6] (From
1992 the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents “has swelled more than five-fold,
peaking at 21,444 in 2011 before leveling off to 19,648 by 2019 . . . [and b]y 2019,
its budget had ballooned to nearly $4.7 billion, increasing year-over-year since
the beginning of the Trump administration.”); Border Patrol Overview, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/alongus-borders/overview [https://perma.cc/K26U-D34D] (“An increase in smuggling
activities has pushed the Border Patrol to the front line of the U.S. war on drugs.
Our role as the primary drug-interdicting organization along the Southwest border
continues to expand.”).
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applied, but it is frequently handed over for use in prosecution by state
courts. Furthermore, Border Patrol has a lengthy and troubled history of
violating even the more circumscribed constitutional rights it is meant
to operate under, raising additional concerns about the use of such
evidence in state proceedings. This is corroborated by the fact that many
of the reverse silver platter legal challenges involve Border Patrol. Apart
from the Border Patrol, the constitutional analysis below also includes
relevant cases from other federal agencies.
A. State Privacy Rights Provisions
Under what circumstances might a federal action violate a state
constitution? It is a longstanding principle of constitutional law that the
rights provided in the U.S. Constitution provide a minimum level of
protection beneath which state actors may not venture. That is to say,
states are free to go beyond the civil liberties laid out in the federal
Constitution and provide additional protections to their own citizens.
Likewise, when a state constitutional provision is similar or identical to
a federal one, state courts are not obligated to interpret the meaning of
their state provisions in the same manner as the U.S. Supreme Court.
For example, the high court has held that even in the face of an illegal
search and seizure, the illegally obtained evidence will still be
admissible—and the exclusionary rule will not apply—if the officer had
a reasonable, good faith belief that they were acting legally at the time.20
However, Connecticut,21 New Jersey,22 New Mexico,23 North
Carolina,24 and Pennsylvania25 do not recognize this “good faith”
exception to the exclusionary rule. In those states, any evidence

20

21

22
23
24
25

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (when a search is unlawful
due to police negligence in procuring the warrant, that negligence alone does not
require the exclusion of the evidence procured by the search); Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (evidence ruled admissible when officers reasonably
relied on invalid warrant due to clerical error of court employee); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (evidence admissible when obtained in
reasonable reliance on an invalidated warrant).
See State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1324 (Conn. 1993) (in the context of the
automobile exception in Connecticut).
See State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856–57 (N.J. 1987).
See State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1993).
See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988).
See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 891–92 (Pa. 1991).
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obtained illegally will be inadmissible in a state case regardless of
whether the officer acted in “good faith.”26
When faced with a question of interpreting a state constitutional
provision that is analogous to the Fourth Amendment, states typically
take one of several approaches. One approach is known as “lockstep,”
whereby a state court interprets a state constitutional provision in
“lockstep” with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the analogous
federal provision.27 With new Court decisions the federal interpretation
of provisions change, and state courts apply those new interpretations to
their own analogous provisions. A similar approach might be called
“lockstep-lite,” meaning the state court reserves the right to interpret
analogous provisions differently, but in practice does so rarely or not at
all.28 Alternatively, a state may take a “primacy” approach, and resolve
questions of civil liberties by relying on state provisions and the state
courts’ independent interpretations thereof; Supreme Court
jurisprudence may or may not be considered presumptively
persuasive.29 The result, therefore, is that the full scope of any individual
citizen’s civil liberties depends upon which state they are in.
Given the practical implications involved, it is worth exploring how
many states provide greater search and seizure protections than the
federal government. A thorough analysis undertaken in 2007 found that
at least 28 states have provided heightened protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures than what exist at the federal level.30
Since that survey, additional developments have taken place: Iowa, for
example, abandoned its lockstep approach in 201031 by issuing several
holdings that expanded the scope of search and seizure protections

26

27

28
29

30
31

In other states, and in federal court, the same evidence obtained under the same
facts would be admissible. See cases cited supra note 20.
Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. L.J. 417,
418, 426 (2007).
See, e.g., id. at 418.
Eric M. Hartmann, Note, Preservation, Primacy, and Process: A More Consistent
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation in Iowa, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2265,
2272–73 (2017).
See Gorman, supra note 27.
Stave v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (holding that “while United
States Supreme Court cases are entitled to respectful consideration, we will
engage in independent analysis of the content of our state search and seizure
provisions”).
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beyond Supreme Court decisions.32 In 2014, Missouri voters approved
a state constitutional amendment explicitly protecting electronic
communications and data from unreasonable search and seizure,
making it the first state in the nation to do so.33
Searches of motorists and their vehicles are the most common type
of Border Patrol search.34 Of the states that are not in “lockstep” and
have vested citizens with increased privacy protections, several
provisions are directly applicable to searches of motorists. Idaho,35
Michigan,36 Minnesota,37 Oregon,38 Rhode Island,39 and Washington40
prohibit sobriety checkpoints under state constitutional provisions.
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 798–99 (Iowa 2018) (holding that
warrantless inventory search of impounded car violates state constitution); State
v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Iowa 2017) (holding that a traffic “stop must
end when reasonable suspicion is no longer present” and a further search
contravenes state constitutional protections); State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Iowa 2015).
MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. The new language reads
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes,
effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, or access electronic data or communication,
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person
or thing to be seized, or the data or communication to be accessed,
as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by
written oath or affirmation.
Id.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) (discussing how
most illegal entrants “leave the border area in private vehicles”).
State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063 (Idaho 1988) (holding that police
roadblocks are unconstitutional under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).
Sitz v. Dept. of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993) (holding that
police “sobriety checklanes violate art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution”).
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183,183–84 (Minn. 1994) (holding
that temporary police “roadblocks violate Minn. Const. art. I, § 10”).
Nelson v. Lane Cty., 743 P.2d 692, 694 (Or. 1987) (affirming the holding of the
appeals court that sobriety checkpoints are unreasonable per Article I, section 9
of the Oregon Constitution).
Pimental v. Dep’t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1352–3 (R.I. 1989) (“police
roadblocks for drunk driving are so violative of our citizen’s rights that they must
be declared unconstitutional” under article I, section 6 of the Rhode Island
Constitution).
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“sobriety
checkpoint program therefore violated petitioners’ rights under article 1, section
7” of the Washington Constitution).
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Statutes in Iowa, Montana, and Wyoming41 list permissible purposes of
law enforcement checkpoints, and sobriety checks are not included. The
U.S. Supreme Court held these checkpoints to be constitutional in
1990.42 Despite this holding, Texas courts have held sobriety
checkpoints to be illegal under the federal Fourth Amendment, “unless
and until a politically accountable [state] governing body sees fit to
enact constitutional guidelines” for their operation.43 A different kind of
vehicle search, using drug detection dogs, is prohibited in New
Hampshire without an articulable reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
involving controlled substances,44 which again, exceeds federal
requirements.45 Colorado prohibits the warrantless, suspicion-less use
of drug detection dogs if the dog is trained to detect marijuana.46
Minnesota requires a heightened level of “individualized articulable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an
investigative stop.”47 Nevada also sets a higher standard than what is
federally required before a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest
is permissible.48 Finally, Iowa has additional restrictions on the legality
of vehicle searches.49
The fact that these states and others provide more extensive privacy
rights than those provided federally creates the potential for federal law
41

42
43
44

45

46
47
48

49

See IOWA CODE § 321K.1 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-502 (2021); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-17-102 (2020). Other states while not explicitly referencing
sobriety checkpoints do prohibit vehicle stops unless police officers have probable
cause thereby excluding sobriety roadblocks. See e.g., WIS. STAT. § 349.02
(2020).
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990) (canine search satisfies state
constitutional requirements when it is, among other requirements, “based on a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the property searched contains controlled
substances”).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005) (warrantless and suspicion-less
drug dog sniffs are constitutional under federal law).
People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 7.
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994).
Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 374 (Nev. 2003) (“We now conclude that, under
the Nevada Constitution, there must exist both probable cause and exigent
circumstances for police to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile incident
to a lawful custodial arrest.”).
See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 3, 12–13 (Iowa 2015) (holding that the
warrantless search of a safe in defendant’s vehicle after his arrest violated the state
constitution).
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enforcement to act in ways that run afoul of state constitutional rights.
Federal officials are ordinarily bound only by federal Fourth
Amendment provisions. This means that state protections that are
analogous to the Fourth Amendment are not applicable to federal
officials acting on behalf of the federal government within the
geographic boundaries of any given state. Yet, what happens when
federal officials move to deliver evidence to state law enforcement for
state prosecution, when that evidence would be inadmissible had it been
obtained by those same state actors?
This question introduces the general “reverse silver platter”
dilemma: federal law enforcement obtains evidence legally under the
U.S. Constitution and hands it to a state for use in a prosecution where
state officials would ordinarily have been prohibited from obtaining and
using that same evidence. In the context of Border Patrol activity, such
a scenario is especially likely when states like Nevada50 and New
Hampshire51 provide additional privacy protections to motorists and
their vehicles. Reverse silver platter issues also arise when Border Patrol
conducts a search without a warrant, or without the level of suspicion
that would have otherwise been required under either the Fourth
Amendment or the state’s Fourth Amendment analogue.
B. State Cases Adopting Reverse Silver Platter
Of the states that have been faced with the reverse silver platter
question, several have adopted the doctrine, and will admit evidence in
a state court prosecution which would have been excluded had it been
obtained by state actors. In a 1973 Maine case, Customs officers turned
over evidence to state police, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
held that there was no constitutional violation in doing so.52 The court
stated that it did not “perceive any policy . . . which would lead us to
forbid this cooperation between federal and state officials.”53
Florida has also admitted reverse silver platter evidence. In Morales
v. State, border officials searched the defendants’ sea-going vessel
without a warrant and discovered marijuana.54 Federal officials declined
to prosecute and instead provided the evidence to local police for state

50
51
52
53
54

Camacho, 75 P.3d at 374.
State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990).
State v. Allard, 313 A.2d 439, 451 (Me. 1973).
Id.
Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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prosecution.55 The Florida Court of Appeals held that because the
evidence was obtained in compliance with federal law, it was admissible
in either a federal or state court.56 However, the court did not provide an
analysis or a rationale for its holding on this issue.57 In another case
involving Border Patrol, Vermont endorsed the reverse silver platter
doctrine when it held that evidence seized by Border Patrol agents at a
checkpoint 97 miles from the border could not be challenged by
reference to search and seizure provisions of the state constitution.58 The
evidence was therefore admissible in state court.59
C. State Cases Adopting Conditional Reverse Silver Platter
A number of states have declined to accept a categorical reverse
silver platter doctrine and instead have adopted a conditional one. These
states have held that the doctrine will apply only if certain conditions
are met. Those conditions typically involve the extent to which state
actors were involved in the search that produced the evidence in
violation of the state constitution.60 If state actors were involved in the
search to a certain threshold degree, or if state and federal actors were
working so closely together that the federal actors might be viewed as
state agents, then state constitutional law applies to determine the
admissibility of evidence. Unfortunately, the level of involvement that
will trigger inadmissibility of the evidence varies and at times is unclear.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, took such a
position in 1989 when it admitted evidence seized by federal officials
that would have violated state constitutional provisions.61 In that case,
55
56
57
58
59

60

61

Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
State v. Rennis, 2014 VT 8, ¶ 2, ¶ 16, 195 Vt. 492, 90 A.3d 906.
See id. at ¶ 11 (citing State v. Dreibelbis, 511 A.2d 307, 308 (Vt. 1986) (“stating
that so long as evidence seized by federal customs officials during routine customs
inspection meets federal standards for such searches, that evidence is admissible
in state prosecution”)). In Rennis the Supreme Court of Vermont used the
reasoning of the Dreibelbis Court to uphold the trial court’s denial of Rennis’
motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 15.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Mass. 1981); State v.
Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1326 (N.J. 1989); Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 754–55
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (absent
involvement by state actors, the state constitution did not require the exclusion of
evidence obtained entirely through the efforts of federal actors).
Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1318.
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federal officers seized the defendant’s hotel telephone records without
a warrant.62 The court nevertheless admitted the evidence, holding that
when “federal officers act[] independently of state authorities and in
conformity with federal law,” the evidence is admissible despite state
law.63 Activities such as “antecedent mutual planning, joint operations,
cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance between” agencies may
eliminate the necessary independence, but “mere contact, awareness of
ongoing investigations, or the exchange of information may not[.]”64
Further, in determining whether a threshold agency relationship was
present, the New Jersey court in State v. Minter looked, in part, to the
purpose of the search: “If a purpose of the investigation is for a State
prosecution, the federal agents can, in effect, be deemed agents of the
State[.]”65
The New Jersey Appellate Court applied this agency standard in a
subsequent case involving the admissibility of a statement to a federal
officer in a state murder prosecution.66 In applying the “vital, significant
condition”67 that the federal agents must have “acted independently and
without cooperation or assistance of our own state officers,”68 the court
addressed whether the federal action could be considered state action to
“any legally significant degree.”69 Because this case involved a “joint,
cooperative effort” between federal and state agencies to investigate the
murder charge, the court found state constitutional protections applied,
and the evidence was excluded.70
Texas appears to have initially taken a similarly skeptical view of
the reverse silver platter doctrine, noting that “[t]he use by state officials
of evidence obtained through a search that did not comport with state
constitutional protections would be problematic,” particularly in the
event of “[s]tate participation in the federal search.”71 Such a scenario
may prevent the admissibility of the evidence in Texas courts, and may

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id. at 1318, 1328–29.
Id. at 1329.
State v. Minter, 561 A.2d 570, 577 (N.J. 1989).
State v. Knight, 661 A.2d 298, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
Id. at 307 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329).
Id. at 308 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1330).
Id. at 307 (quoting Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329).
Id. at 309.
Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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also invalidate a state search warrant obtained on the basis of that
evidence.72
In Pena v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals again addressed a fact
scenario raising similar questions.73 There, Border Patrol was
participating in a joint operation with the Texas Department of Public
Safety (“DPS”) at an international bridge in Brownsville.74 While
Customs agents were looking for individuals illegally transporting
weapons, ammunition, or excessive currency across the border into
Mexico, the DPS was searching for stolen vehicles and vehicles with
altered VIN plates.75 Both federal and state agents involved in the
operation questioned and detained suspects.76 The court held that
“[e]vidence that is obtained by federal agents acting lawfully and in
conformity with federal authority is admissible in state proceedings,”77
thereby recognizing the reverse silver platter doctrine. The court
qualified this holding by noting that the question turned on the nature of
the relationship and agency between federal and state officers.78 In other
words, if Customs agents are, in effect, acting as agents for the state
police and doing so under color of state law, then “the border search
exception ‘may not be used to circumvent the constitutional requirement
of probable cause placed on police officers.’”79 Consistent with other
conditional reverse silver platter jurisdictions, the court determined that
“[e]vidence of antecedent mutual planning, joint operations,
cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance”80 were central to the
inquiry, all of which suggest an agency relationship. Awareness of
investigations or communication between the agencies alone would not
be enough.81
72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. In this case, the evidence was admissible because the search complied with the
terms of both the Fourth Amendment and the Texas Constitution. Id. at 192. The
admissibility of the federally-obtained evidence in state court was thus not an
endorsement of reverse silver platter; indeed, the court’s discussion of that issue
offers a rejection of it. Id. at 190.
Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 750–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 754 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Id. (citing State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1326–27 (N.J. 1989)).
Id. at 755 (quoting People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 863, 865–66 (N.Y. 1975)).
Id. (quoting State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
Id.
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The court appears to then relax this standard, pronouncing that
“[n]ot every joint operation” would trigger an agency relationship.82 In
fact, the operation in this case did not, because “there is no reason that
the limited forces of the Customs Service cannot enlist the aid of other
law enforcement entities in forming task forces to meet their needs.”83
This no reason why not approach was further clarified by a standard that
in order for evidence to be admissible in state court in violation of state
law, the search conducted during a federal-state collaboration merely
had to be conducted “under the aegis of and in cooperation with
Customs agents.”84 This applies even where the two agencies were
operating with distinct purposes, as they were in this case.85 However,
the “under the aegis of and in cooperation with Customs agents”
standard is not only vague, but appears to be exceptionally weak, as
nearly every joint operation would likely fit this criterion. Under this
standard, even with significant involvement by state actors, if federal
agents are involved at all, federal rules will apply. The result is that
nearly every joint operation between federal agents and state officers
would only be subject to federal law. Federal gathering of evidence is
in fact the entire premise of reverse silver platter; it cannot also function
as a standard by which to conditionally accept it. Doing so amounts to
an elimination of any agency criterion whatsoever.
The Pena Court’s standard is all the more problematic when one
considers that Texas law enforcement is constitutionally prohibited
from conducting checkpoint stops to locate stolen cars under both
federal and state law.86 The cooperative efforts between Texas law
enforcement officers and Border Patrol enabled the Texas officers to
utilize prohibited “general crime control” checkpoints under the guise
of Border Patrol’s border search exception. The same checkpoints, if
conducted without Border Patrol agents, would be explicitly prohibited
by both state and federal law.87 The standard laid out by the Texas court
is fundamentally at odds with that same court’s acknowledgement that
“[t]he ‘core evil’ to be prevented is the ‘misconduct of local law
enforcement agents in using Federal Customs agents to conduct a local
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Id. (quoting Alfonso, 759 F.2d at 735).
Id. at 756 (citing United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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investigation by unlawful means.’”88 Determining that a federal-state
operation was conducted under federal auspices and with their
cooperation does nothing to address this risk of illegal state conduct.
Unsurprisingly, the court determined that the facts of this case did not
rise to the level of impermissible agency and admitted the evidence.89
Massachusetts also appears to employ a conditional reverse silver
platter doctrine. In Commonwealth v. Jarabek, the Supreme Judicial
Court addressed the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s
conversations that had been recorded in violation of state law pursuant
to a joint state-federal operation.90 The court held that even in the face
of “heavy Federal presence,” where the recordings in question were
made by federal agents and pursuant to federal law, a combined statefederal operation necessitates the application of state privacy
protections provided by Massachusetts statute.91 More than a decade
later, the same court admitted evidence where the investigation was
“essentially” federal in nature, with “minimal” assistance provided by
state actors.92 However, apparently acknowledging the broad potential
implications of the holding, the court stated that “[n]othing in this
opinion should be read as endorsing a ‘reverse silver platter’ doctrine.”93
Given that the court was in fact accepting reverse silver platter evidence,
it is unclear how it understood the doctrine it was refusing to endorse.
The primary issue for the court in both cases appears to turn on the
degree of state versus federal participation in the operation in question,
though there is a distinct lack of clarity in identifying the threshold
degree of prohibited participation.
The Washington Supreme Court endorsed a conditional reverse
silver platter doctrine in 1986 when it held that evidence obtained in a
manner that would have violated state law was nevertheless admissible
if it was obtained by federal officials according to federal standards.94
88

89
90
91
92

93
94

Pena, 61 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting People v. Desnoyers, 705 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856
(2000)).
Id. at 758.
Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Mass. 1981).
Id. at 493.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455, 457–58 (Mass. 1997). The court
declined to hold that “the slightest level of assistance from local law enforcement”
to federal agents triggered state protections. Id. at 457.
Id. at 457.
State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). Oddly, the case did
not mention a state Supreme Court decision from six years prior coming to the
opposite conclusion: that the state privacy act applied to evidence used in state
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In Washington, the conditional reverse silver platter doctrine only
applies when: (1) the evidence was lawfully obtained in the alternate
jurisdiction; and (2) the state actors did not “act as agents or cooperate
with . . . the foreign jurisdiction.” 95 This appears to be a broad
exclusion that is not dependent upon the degree of cooperation, but
whether any existed at all. In the absence of such cooperation, the
federally obtained evidence would be accepted in state courts.96
D. State Cases Rejecting Reverse Silver Platter
New York state has taken a critical view of the reverse silver platter
doctrine. In several cases involving Border Patrol searches, its courts

95

96

court, even when it was obtained by federal agents consistent with federal law,
rendering the evidence inadmissible in state court. See State v. Williams, 617 P.2d
1012, 1018 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
State v. Vance, 444 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). See also State v.
Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 577 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (“[A]ntecedent mutual
planning, joint operations, cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance
between federal and state officers may sufficiently establish agency and serve to
bring the conduct of the federal agents under the color of state law.” (quoting State
v. Gwinner, 796 P.2d 728, 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)); In re Teddington, 808
P.2d 156, 163 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (“searches conducted by federal officers
pursuant to federal law are admissible in Washington courts notwithstanding the
dictates of our state constitution”); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 988–89 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994) (“evidence that is lawfully obtained by federal officers” admissible
in state court even if state constitution would have required its exclusion, provided
that federal officers acted without the cooperation or assistance of state officers);
Gwinner, 796 P.2d at 731–32 (evidence obtained by “federal officers who were
not acting in cooperation with or at the request of state officers[,]” was admissible
in state criminal trial).
A number of other Washington decisions have endorsed a reverse silver platter
with respect to federal actions. See, e.g., State v. Mezquia, 118 P.3d 378, 385–86
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (lawfully obtained evidence of defendant’s DNA test
results from a cheek swab conducted in Florida deemed admissible in state murder
trial even though the evidence, if obtained in Washington, would violate
Washington law). Tennessee and Alaska have taken a similar approach to that of
the Washington courts. See State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tenn. 1993)
(Tennessee constitutional provisions applied where a Kentucky search warrant
was obtained at the request of Tennessee authorities pursuant to a state agent’s
affidavit); State v. Hudson, 849 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. 1993) (if federal agents
act “wholly independently” from state agents, federal law governs; when federal
agents act in cooperation with state officers, state law applies); See also Pooley v.
State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“[T]he Alaska Constitution
was not implicated” when evidence was seized in Alaska by agents acting
pursuant to a warrant lawfully issued in California as there was no evidence of an
ongoing joint effort between the two jurisdictions).
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have excluded evidence obtained by federal agents which was
subsequently provided to the state for prosecution. In People v. LePera,
a Customs inspector conducted a search of the defendant, and seized
gambling records which were later provided to state prosecutors.97 The
court held that, even when the legality of the initial stop and search
under federal law is unquestioned, the evidence was not admissible in
state court.98 The search was conducted pursuant to the border search
exception.99 The limited purpose for the border search exception, the
court noted, was to “effectively enforce the Customs laws.”100 Actions
that are permitted under this exception would be unreasonable and
prohibited if undertaken for other purposes. The court emphasized that
the “special limited powers” of border officials did not include general
law enforcement or criminal investigation.101 Therefore, the federal
official in LePera “exceeded his authority” by seizing the defendant’s
gambling records on behalf of local law enforcement because the
records were only relevant to state criminal law.102 In excluding the
evidence, the court noted that the border search exception “may not be
used to circumvent the constitutional requirement of probable cause
placed upon police officers.”103 It is noteworthy that the court drew this
conclusion even in the absence of any local police involvement or
wrongdoing at the time of the search and seizure.
Similarly, an earlier New York trial court held that evidence of a
stolen credit card seized by a border agent in the course of a border
search was inadmissible in a state prosecution.104 The court noted that
“the purpose of the [customs] statute was to prevent smuggling of aliens,
contraband, or merchandise subject to duty.”105 “Since a credit card is
not contraband or merchandise subject to duty,” it would not be within

97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104

105

People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395–96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 396. The border search exception permits warrantless searches without
probable cause in circumstances in which they would not otherwise apply, i.e.,
away from the border or if performed by other agencies. Id.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. (quoting People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 863, 865–66 (N.Y. 1975)).
People v. Regnet, 443 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645, 647 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (granting
defendant’s motion to suppress the credit card evidence).
Id. at 645.
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the proper jurisdiction of customs agents,106 thus rendering the search
improper and inadmissible in the state’s prosecution. A few years later
the scope of the issue was presented even more expansively. In People
v. Griminger, the state’s highest court rejected the prosecution’s
argument that only federal law should apply to the admissibility of
evidence in state court where a federal warrant was “executed by
Federal agents.”107 The court stated, “[s]ince defendant has been tried
for crimes defined by the State’s Penal Law, we can discern no reason
why he should not also be afforded the benefit of our State’s search and
seizure protections.”108 However, a trial court in that state later held
when the subject of the search was properly within Customs’ purview
(i.e., there is a “significant Federal interest” in the subject of the search,
such as the international “transport of hazardous medical materials”),
then the evidence obtained from it may be used in a state prosecution.109
The Supreme Court of Oregon likewise rejected the reverse silver
platter doctrine in 1992 when it decided People v. Davis. Although the
evidence in question was obtained in another state rather than by the
federal government, the court held that the emphasis on individual rights
within the Oregon Constitution necessitated the conclusion that its
search and seizure provisions apply to any evidence proffered in state
court.110 The court reasoned that the holding applied no “matter where
that evidence was obtained (in-state or out-of-state), or what
governmental entity (local, state, federal, or out-of-state) obtained it.”111
The court acknowledged that this holding may mean that evidence will
be excluded even when out-of-state agents act in good faith.112 The court
ultimately held this possibility to be peripheral to the central issue: state
constitutional rights are guaranteed to the individual defendant in state
courts, and the only way to effectuate those rights is by applying them
in state trials.113 As a result, the exclusionary rule applies to all evidence
in Oregon state trials, and it cannot be overcome by reference to where
or by whom it was obtained.114 The same court affirmed this ruling a
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 412 (N.Y. 1988).
Id.
People v. Desnoyers, 705 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
State v. Davis, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012–13 (Or. 1992).
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id. at 1012–13.
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year later in State v. Rodriguez, where evidence legally obtained by a
federal agent under federal law was excluded from the state trial because
it violated Oregon’s constitutional provisions.115 The court “[saw] no
reason why the factual distinction between a state officer and a federal
officer has any legal significance in determining whether certain
evidence is admissible in an Oregon criminal prosecution.”116 The
holding was reaffirmed by the court once again in 2017.117
The New Mexico Supreme Court followed Oregon’s lead and dealt
a solid blow to the reverse silver platter doctrine in 2001 with State v.
Cardenas-Alvarez.118 The motorist defendant in that case encountered a
permanent Border Patrol checkpoint.119 After initial questioning, the
federal agent “ordered the [d]efendant to a secondary inspection area”
for further questioning and a vehicle search, during which marijuana
was found.120 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that (1) the agent’s
actions did not violate the federal constitution; (2) the agent’s actions
did violate the state constitution; and (3) the evidence must be excluded
from state court as a result of that violation.121 Similarly, the Indiana
Supreme Court applied the state constitution when determining whether
a state prosecutor should be permitted to base a conviction upon
evidence that was the product of a federal warrant.122 More recently, in
2011 the Hawaii Supreme Court decided State v. Torres, and overturned
state precedent from 1996 by holding that evidence obtained in another
jurisdiction should be subject to admissibility review under Hawaii
law.123
A reverse silver platter issue was raised in New Hampshire in a case
stemming from events that occurred in August and September of 2017.
Border Patrol set up a temporary checkpoint in the town of Woodstock,
New Hampshire, approximately 90 miles south of the Canadian
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
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State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399, 403 (Or. 1993).
Id.
State v. Keller, 396 P.3d 917, 922 (Or. 2017).
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001).
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 228. The court held that prolonging a border stop beyond “questions
regarding citizenship and immigration status” required reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity under the New Mexico Constitution. Id. at 231. No such
suspicion existed in this case, rendering the search illegal under state law. Id.
Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 542 (Ind. 1994).
State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1021 (Haw. 2011).
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border.124 Border Patrol used drug detection “dogs to monitor the
vehicles passing through the checkpoints[,]” and those that elicited an
alert from the dog were searched by Border Patrol officers without a
warrant.125 Local law enforcement was present at these checkpoints, and
any illegal controlled substances discovered as a result of these searches
were provided to the local police for prosecution in state court. 126 The
operation resulted in forty-four people being charged “with possession
of small amounts of controlled substances – mostly marijuana.”127
The defendants argued that the warrantless searches violated both
the federal and state constitutions.128 The court appeared to
acknowledge this divergence in protections with respect to using drug
detection dogs, surmising that the evidence in question would be
admissible in federal court before discussing its admissibility in the state
court.129
Both the state and Border Patrol agents argued that “the primary
purpose of the . . . checkpoints was to maintain the integrity of the
[country’s] international borders.”130 The court was highly skeptical of
this assertion, noting that the number of arrests for immigration
violations was significantly less than number of arrests for drug
possession.131 Furthermore, of the twenty-five immigration-related
arrests, none had illegally crossed the Canadian border; rather, “most of
the individuals arrested for immigration violations had entered the
United States legally but had overstayed visas.”132 The court found that

124
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126
127
128

129
130
131
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State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, 2018 WL 2106769, at *1 (N.H.
Super. May 1, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2. For purposes of this Article, it will be presumed that the vehicular
searches were consistent with federal law, but not with state constitutional
provisions. The legality of Border Patrol actions in this case was also in dispute;
indeed, the trial court ultimately held that federal constitutional provisions were
also violated, stating that “the primary purpose of a motor vehicle checkpoint
cannot be the random detection of criminal activity such as drug detection. As
such, the checkpoints were unconstitutional under both State and federal law.” Id.
at *8.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id. & n.15.
Id. at *8.
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the primary purpose of the checkpoints was not immigration-related, but
drug interdiction.133
The court determined that evidence uncovered through the use of
drug dogs without reasonable suspicion is clearly inadmissible under
state constitutional provisions.134 It then turned to the question of
whether the admissibility analysis changes by virtue of the fact that the
evidence was first obtained by federal Border Patrol officers rather than
state agents.135 This is the essence of the reverse silver platter question.
The court rejected that doctrine and excluded all of the evidence
obtained in this fashion, holding that “the inadmissibility of the
evidence does not change based on the fact that it was seized by federal
officers and then handed over to the State.”136
III. ANALYSIS OF REVERSE SILVER PLATTER ARGUMENTS
A. The Issue of “Control”
State courts adopting the reverse silver platter doctrine have done so
by relying on several arguments. First, courts often focus on the issue
of “control”—in essence, the question is whether state law or courts may
control the actions of federal officials.137 When framed this way, the
answer is undisputedly negative. Federal law enforcement officers
operate independently from the states in which they are located and are
bound only by federal rules rather than the particular laws of the state in
which they are acting.138 Accordingly, no state may properly “control”
the actions of federal agents.
For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that “the Vermont
Constitution does not apply to the conduct of federal government
officials acting under . . . exclusive federal authority.”139 Courts in New
Jersey, Texas, and Washington also focused on whether the state could
“control” the actions of federal agents. In State v. Mollica, the New
133

134
135
136
137

138

139

Id. This would render the checkpoint unconstitutional under federal law, too. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
McCarthy, 2018 WL 2106769, at *7.
Id.
Id.
See State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J. 1989); see also State v. Coburn,
683 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Vt. 1996).
See Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1330; See also State v. Toone, 823 S.W.2d 744, 748
(Tex. App. 1992).
Coburn, 683 A.2d at 1347.
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Jersey court noted that “state constitutions do not control federal
action”140 in its rationale for accepting the evidence proffered. In State
v. Toone, the Texas Court of Appeals held that “protections afforded by
the constitution of a sovereign entity control the actions only of the
agents of that sovereign entity.”141 As a result, state constitutional
provisions did not apply to the actions of those federal agents nor, by
extension, to the evidence resulting therefrom. The Supreme Court of
Washington also focused on the inability of the state constitution to
“control federal officers’ conduct” when it held in State v. Bradley that
the Border Patrol agents’ actions complied with the federal
requirements, thus rendering the evidence admissible.142
These courts declined to acknowledge that the defendants’
arguments were focused on actions of the state entity, not the federal, in
their claim that the state’s prosecutorial apparatus should not be
permitted to use evidence that was obtained illegally according to state
law. The issue is presented as a question of who may control federal
agents. This, however, misstates the fundamental question. State law
cannot dictate federal operations, and the defendants did not argue that
it should. Rather, the issue is whether state prosecutors may use
evidence obtained by federal actors in violation of state rules, or should
state protections require the exclusion of evidence so obtained.
The New Mexico Supreme Court responded to the “control”
argument advanced by state prosecutors, who asserted that the state
constitution “cannot apply to federal agents.”143 In rejecting this
argument, the court held:
We find no mandate in the text of [the state constitution], nor in our
jurisprudence interpreting this clause, to selectively protect New
Mexico’s inhabitants from intrusions committed by state but not
federal governmental actors. Nor do we believe such a limitation is
appropriate . . . . [F]ederal agents exercise jurisdiction over New
Mexicans and possess the authority to systematically subject our
inhabitants to searches, seizures and other interferences. A federal
agent who wields these powers unreasonably commits precisely the
sort of “unwarranted governmental intrusion” against which the
New Mexico Constitution ensures.144

140
141

142
143
144

Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327.
Toone, 823 S.W.2d at 748 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 265 U.S. 465, 475
(1921)).
State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225, 231–32 (N.M. 2001).
Id. at 232.
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As for the concern that such a result makes legal federal actions illegal,
the court noted that federal agents remain able to vigilantly enforce
federal law.145 The court’s decision does not impact that ability, nor does
it attempt to constrain what evidence is used in federal court. But
“[w]hen such vigilance violates the protections guaranteed by our state
constitution . . . we will not abandon our guard of those protections in
order to accommodate evidence thereby yielded . . . . [W]e do possess
the authority—and indeed the duty—to insulate our courts from
evidence seized in contravention of our state’s constitution.”146 The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged the solvency of this analysis in Wilson v.
Schnettler.147 That case involved an injunction prohibiting federal
narcotics agents from testifying against the defendant in a state criminal
trial.148 The original search was legal under federal law, but the Court’s
analysis remains applicable to a case involving an illegal initial
search.149 In his dissent, Justice Douglas writes “[i]n the state trial the
issue will not be whether the federal agents have acted within the limits
of their federal authority, but whether, under the state constitution, the
search was a reasonable one.”150 This captures the crux of the analysis
undertaken in reverse silver platter cases.
B. The Foregone Conclusion: A ‘Legal’ Search Equals
Admissible Evidence
It is also commonly argued that if the search was legal in the
jurisdiction in which it was conducted (including federally), it should be
admissible in the state court trial. Courts employing this argument state
it as a foregone conclusion, rarely explaining why such a conclusion is
warranted. The Tennessee Supreme Court provided some additional
rationale related to this claim in State v. Cauley.151 In that case, two
brothers committed a murder in Tennessee and were convicted using
evidence uncovered pursuant to a valid Kentucky search warrant.152 The
court noted that there will inevitably be occasions where a state’s law
enforcement efforts require the assistance of another jurisdiction,
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 233.
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385 (1961).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 391 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tenn. 1993).
Id. at 413–414.
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leading to cooperation between the jurisdictions.153 It is perhaps
unreasonable to expect the agents of one state to be familiar with another
state’s particular constitutional provisions, and even if they were, they
may be uncomfortable with applying standards and procedures that
deviate from their own.154 The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized
these concerns but upheld the application of the Tennessee Constitution
despite them, as they were insufficient to override the fundamental
rights of state citizens.155 That case involved state-to-state cooperation;
it is less clear whether those concerns would apply to the same degree
when considering federal-to-state cooperation. Nearly all the cases
discussed here involved federal agents acting within the boundaries of
the state in question, meaning that the state already had jurisdiction over
the defendant and was free to act on its own volition consistent with
state constitutional provisions. When the state enlists the assistance of
the federal government, or vice-versa, it is often a matter of convenience
or an attempt to circumvent the protections afforded by state law rather
than as a matter of necessity. Unlike a situation where a Tennessee
suspect has relocated to Kentucky, a state suspect cannot “relocate” to
a federal jurisdiction wherein the federal government must be enlisted
to search and apprehend him.
C. The Question of Acting in “Good Faith”
It may also be argued that rejecting reverse silver platter evidence
punishes law enforcement even when they act in good faith. Although
it is probable that bad faith does exist in some cases, it is also true that
in at least some of the cases, both federal and state law enforcement
acted reasonably and in good faith according to applicable law in
obtaining the evidence. Why, then, should law enforcement be
penalized when they did not intentionally do wrong?
This focus misconstrues the fundamental nature of search and
seizure provisions. Those provisions are not, at their core, about
punishing law enforcement for misdeeds—or even about upholding
rules for law enforcement in general. Rather, they are about the rights
of the individual to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.156
As such, it does not matter to the individual who violated that right, or
by what legal jurisdiction the violation was accomplished, or whether it
153
154
155
156

Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST amend. IV.
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was done out of good will or ill. What matters is whether a given state
has determined that a particular right is central to state citizenship. In
that situation it would be improper for the courts of that state to welcome
and use evidence obtained in contravention of rights the legislature
deems sacrosanct. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Elkins,
To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been
invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer. It would be a
curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the United
States to differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence
upon so arbitrary a basis. Such a distinction indeed would appear to
reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the provisions of the
Constitution.157

Indeed, the issue in Elkins was that states were operating under fewer
restrictions, with more ability to violate privacy rights, and then handing
over evidence to the federal government.158 In rejecting this, the
Supreme Court was saying that the dual-jurisdiction mechanism cannot
be used as an end-run around fundamental constitutional protections.
There is no logical reason why this same principle should not operate
when the evidence is being transferred from federal to state rather than
vice versa.
In New Jersey, the Mollica court asserted that the reverse silver
platter doctrine is acceptable because “no state official or person acting
under color of state law has violated the State Constitution” therefore,
“no citizen’s individual constitutional rights fail of vindication.”159 The
court is taking an illogically narrow conception of what it looks like
when individual rights “fail of vindication.” When the court seemingly
disregards the fact that the state court is endorsing the violation of the
New Jersey Constitution, the individual’s state constitutional rights
most certainly do fail of vindication. Surely a given right would be a
hollow one—and would not be vindicated—if the very state that
guarantees the right is unwilling to protect it in its own courts. The fact
that the state’s own agents cannot be blamed (or entirely blamed) for the
violation does not vitiate the violation. Selectively nullifying state
157
158
159

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960).
Id. at 210.
State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 1988). See also People v. Blair, 602
P.2d 738, 748 (Cal. 1979) (holding that accepting reverse silver platter evidence
does not impair the vindication of individual state rights), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (as amended by the 1982
Proposition 8), as recognized in People v. Lissauer, 215 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336 n.1
(Ct. App. 1985).
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protections simply because the evidence was gathered by federal agents
would impose an arbitrary distinction that “reflect[s] an indefensibly
selective evaluation of the provisions of the [state] Constitution.”160
Fundamentally, if a state has determined that certain rights are central
to state citizenship, then those rights should be protected in state trials.
D. The Implications of Judicial Integrity
Another element discussed in reverse silver platter evidence
arguments is that of judicial integrity. Judicial integrity as a principle is
meant to “relieve the courts from being compelled to participate in
illegal conduct.”161 While a few courts that have accepted the reverse
silver platter doctrine mention judicial integrity, they have rejected its
salience, primarily by reasoning that if the evidence was obtained by
federal agents according to federal law, then judicial integrity is not
implicated in a decision to admit the evidence in state court.162 For
example, in People v. Blair the California Supreme Court held that
because there was no illegal conduct in the evidence seizure itself,
concerns of judicial integrity did not apply to the state’s use of the
evidence.163 The Mollica court similarly asserted that reverse silver
platter evidence did not implicate judicial integrity concerns because it
involves no “misuse or perversion of judicial process.”164
However, this too is an unduly narrow conception of judicial
integrity. In taking a broader view, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has asserted that the purpose of judicial integrity is the
“dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct.”165 Yet it is difficult
to argue that the integrity of the judiciary is upheld when courts admit
evidence gathered in clear violation of state constitutional protections.
It is inconsistent for a state to demand that citizens obey the law while
condoning the violation of constitutional rights by state actors. Indeed,
“[o]ut of regard for its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian
of liberty the court should not have a hand in such ‘dirty business.’”166
160
161
162

163
164
165
166

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215.
Blair, 602 P.2d at 748.
See, e.g., id.; State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e do not
believe deterrence or judicial integrity necessarily require a reexamination of the
search under standards that hypothetically would have prevailed if the search had
been performed by state authorities.”); Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328.
Blair, 602 P.2d at 748.
Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 N.E.2d 845, 851 (Mass. 2010).
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (Cal. 1955) (in banc).
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Though a court may not be participating in illegal conduct at the outset
or placing a “judicial imprimatur on lawlessness”167 with respect to the
initial search, it would be participating in the abrogation of the rights of
its own citizens, by placing a judicial imprimatur on their violation. The
Hawaii Supreme Court recognized this in Torres, holding that “if state
courts admitted evidence in a state prosecution that was obtained in a
manner that would be unlawful under our constitution, our courts would
necessarily be placing their imprimatur of approval on evidence that
would otherwise be deemed illegal, thus compromising the integrity of
our courts.”168 Therefore, rejecting the reverse silver platter doctrine
would uphold the judicial integrity of state courts. It would also serve to
maintain consistent standards informed by the state constitution in all
criminal cases within those courts.
E. Deterrence and Disincentivizing Police Misconduct
The acceptance of the reverse silver platter doctrine directly
compromises state efforts to guarantee constitutional protections to
citizens. It creates perverse incentives for federal agents to bypass state
protections. Because the fruit of that violation can still be used in a state
criminal trial, state actors also have reason to encourage it. Indeed,
agents of different jurisdictions will have clear motive to work together
in order to avoid legal proscriptions placed on the state.169 Those
incentives were part of the Elkins Court’s rationale in rejecting the silver
platter doctrine.170 The U.S. Supreme Court noted their obvious
existence in state-to-federal cases; it would be naïve to assume the same
incentives do not work in the reverse direction. The New Jersey
Supreme Court noted this concern in Minter: “Certainly we would not
permit State investigators to circumvent the law by merely calling the
federal agents and asking them to tap a phone.”171 Yet accepting reverse
silver platter evidence invites such misconduct.
A corollary of the incentives issue is deterrence of police
misconduct. Several courts have asserted that, since one of the primary
purposes of the exclusionary rule is to prevent law enforcement from
167
168
169

170
171

Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Haw. 2011).
See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring Challenge of
Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293, 293, 297 (2013)
(examining how the unlawful “working arrangements” of law enforcement
agencies infringe upon citizens’ individual rights).
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
State v. Minter, 561 A.2d 570, 577 (N.J. 1989).
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violating individual rights, that purpose is inapplicable in the case of
reverse silver platter evidence because the initial search was legal in the
jurisdiction in which it was obtained.172 For if the state did not itself
obtain the evidence, and the federal officers who conducted the search
acted legally according to federal law, then there is no deterrence to be
expected or desired from excluding the evidence. Indeed, the Mollica
court centered its analysis of the New Jersey Constitution’s protections
against unreasonable search and seizure entirely around the issue of
deterrence of police misconduct.173 The court suggested that if state
police did nothing wrong, and therefore would not be deterred by
excluding reverse silver platter evidence, then there is no reason to reject
it.174 The Maine Supreme Court echoed that of New Jersey when it made
the sweeping assertion that “[t]he turning over of evidence does not
promote improper conduct by either local police or Customs agents.”175
This logic frames the issue too narrowly. In the face of incentives
and rewards for cooperating with, enlisting the help of, or even simply
welcoming ill-gotten evidence, precisely what might be deterred by a
rejection of reverse silver platter evidence are cooperative schemes that
ignore state constitutional rights. Whether law enforcement actions are
deliberate and premeditated or not, the circumvention of those rights is
certainly something worth avoiding. Prohibiting this evidence
encourages law enforcement to operate within the boundaries and
restrictions laid out within their own jurisdictions and discourages the
curtailing of individual liberties.
Advocates of the reverse silver platter doctrine may point out that
rejecting this evidence will mean that some state criminal cases will be
precluded from prosecution despite clear evidence of wrongdoing, and
some criminals may, as a result, go free. This is undoubtedly true. Yet
without more, it is an exceptionally weak argument in a discussion of
constitutional rights and civil liberties. Certainly, all law enforcement
limitations provided by search and seizure protections will preclude
some criminal cases and will likely result in some criminals going free.
172

173
174
175

See, e.g., People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 748 (Cal. 1979) (accepting reverse silver
platter evidence does not impair objectives of deterring police misconduct); State
v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 2017) (“[W]e do not believe deterrence
or judicial integrity necessarily require a reexamination of the search under
standards that hypothetically would have prevailed if the search had been
performed by state authorities.”).
State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 1989).
Id.
State v. Allard, 313 A.2d 439, 451 (Me. 1973).

262

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 232

But maximum efficiency in apprehending criminals is not the purpose
of search and seizure protections and should not be a basis for upholding
or rejecting them. These protections inherently limit the methods by
which law enforcement may investigate crimes, and this was considered
an appropriate trade-off in protecting the rights of all citizens.176
Indiscriminately searching the homes of all citizens would undoubtedly
lead police to uncovering more criminal actors. It is also true that some
criminals will escape prosecution if the state is not allowed to use
evidence gathered by federal officers in violation of state rights. Neither
of these possibilities operate as sound reasoning for permitting these
searches.
F. The Problems with Adopting a Conditional Reverse Silver
Platter Doctrine
Adopting the conditional reverse silver platter doctrine is also rife
with concerns. The standard is vague and difficult to apply. It can be
construed as applying to advance knowledge, request,177
participation,178 assistance,179 cooperation,180 mutual planning181 or
176

177

178

179

180

181

See, e.g., New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“On one side of the
balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order.”); see also Fourth Amendment, CORNELL L.
SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment
[https://perma.cc/QKB3-H4SF].
State v. Minter, 561 A.2d 570, 577 (N.J. 1989) (“Certainly we would not permit
State investigators to circumvent the law by merely calling the federal agents and
asking them to tap a phone.”).
See Lockett v. State, 879 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“[s]tate
participation in the federal search could prevent the state from accepting the
‘silver platter’ of evidence from the federal search”).
See Pena v. State, 61 S.W.3d 745, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“mutual assistance
between state and federal officers may sufficiently establish agency and serve to
bring the conduct of the federal agents under the color of state law”).
See State v. Knight, 661 A.2d 298, 308 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (federal
agents must have “acted independently and without cooperation or assistance of
our own state officers” (quoting State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1330 (N.J.
1989))); State v. Mezquia, 118 P.3d 378, 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (condition
for the admissibility of reverse silver platter evidence is that state actors “did not
act as agents or cooperate or assist the foreign jurisdiction” (citing State v. Fowler,
111 P.3d 1264, 1265 (2005)).
See Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1329 (“antecedent mutual planning, joint operations,
cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance between federal and state officers
may” eliminate the necessary independence).
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formal joint operations.182 It could also apply when federal agents are
acting “under the color of state law,”183 or when their presence is so
“heavy”184 or involved as to turn the local efforts into “essentially a
Federal investigation.”185 Some courts have set the standard as whether
federal action could be considered state action to “any legally significant
degree,”186 despite the fact that a “legally significant degree” sets both
a vague and subjective measure. Other courts have even required
evidence of a deliberate intent to evade the forum state’s provisions in
order to find an agency relationship.187 For instance, in a case involving
federal-state cooperation and a wiretap that was patently illegal under
state law, the Illinois Supreme Court held that in order for the evidence
to be suppressed, there must be evidence of a “secret agreement; secret
cooperation [between the federal and state agency] for a fraudulent or
deceitful purpose.”188 Thus, even in the presence of a cooperative
enterprise and agency relationship, the suppression of the evidence turns
on whether the actors had a subjective intent to deceive. Such evidence
will be exceptionally difficult to secure.
These standards make it difficult to ascertain—prospectively or
retrospectively—at what point state participation will tip the scales in
favor of the application of state law. Such an approach also “ignores the
existence of more subtle ‘understandings’ among repeat-player
domestic law enforcement agencies,”189 where clear evidence of
cooperation may not be available despite the fact that there was a
cooperative understanding of some sort. This standard also overlooks
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185

186
187
188
189

See Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Mass. 1981) (when state
and federal officials engage in a “combined operation” the stricter constitutional
protections of the two jurisdictions involved governs the admissibility of evidence
seized).
Pena, 61 S.W.3d at 755.
Jarabek, 424 N.E.2d at 493 (in the face of “heavy Federal presence,” where the
recordings in question were made by federal agents and pursuant to federal law,
a state-oriented investigation necessitates the application of state privacy
protections provided by Massachusetts statute).
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Mass. 1997) (where the
investigation was “essentially” federal in nature, the “minimal” assistance
provided by state actors did not alter the federal standards applicable to the case).
See, e.g., State v. Knight, 661 A.2d 298, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 882 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 2008).
Id. (quoting People v. Burnom, 790 N.E.2d 14, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
Logan, supra note 169, at 322.
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the opportunity for “strategic manipulation”190 of jurisdictional rules,
while leaving cases open to inconsistent application and overly-rigid
interpretation of what conduct amounts to agency.
Just as the silver platter doctrine subverts the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, the reverse silver platter doctrine subverts the
independent protections of state constitutions. States that have
interpreted their constitutions as providing more protection than the
Federal Constitution would in many cases instead be reduced to
applying only the minimum protections of federal law.
IV. REVERSE SILVER PLATTER AND U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION (“CBP”)
Unique concerns arise when states use evidence obtained by Border
Patrol specifically, as opposed to other federal agencies. The Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”191 Probable cause is
defined as an objectively reasonable belief, based on the circumstances,
that an immigration violation or crime has likely occurred; it is a higher
standard to meet than reasonable suspicion.192 In effect, this means that
before conducting a search of a person or her belongings, law
enforcement officers must first obtain a warrant from a judge, based on
probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found. Failing to do so
runs afoul of the federal Constitution and violates the rights of the
individual.
Border Patrol, however, has been jurisprudentially granted
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.193 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the government’s interest in monitoring
and controlling entrants outweighs the privacy interest of the individual,

190

191
192
193

Id. at 323; see also JOHN ASHCROFT ET AL., FIGHTING URBAN CRIME: THE
EVOLUTION
OF
FEDERAL-LOCAL
COLLABORATION
2–3
(2003),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/197040.pdf
[https://perma.cc/466F-DG75]
(discussing less restrictive federal standards for obtaining search warrants and
conducting wiretaps, while recognizing that inter-governmental collaboration is
likely to expand, and noting “operational incentives” for collaboration).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973).
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thus reducing the expectation of privacy at the border.194 As a result,
routine searches without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion are inherently reasonable and automatically justified in this
specific context.195 Fourth Amendment rights are therefore significantly
circumscribed at the border, and CBP is given expansive authority to
randomly and without suspicion search, seize, and detain individuals
and property at border crossings.196 As a result, the circumstances under
which a Border Patrol agent can conduct a warrantless search without
probable cause are broader than exists for any other law enforcement
agency.
Although nothing in the Fourth Amendment or elsewhere in the
Constitution provides for such a principle, this doctrine has become
known as the “border search exception” to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.197 The precise scope of this exception is in
dispute and continues to be tested considering that Border Patrol now
engages in searches not only of suitcases and bags, but also electronic
devices such as cell phones and laptops—sometimes confiscating them
without cause.198 Agents have also detained entrants for long periods of
time without any apparent or stated reason,199 even engaging in invasive
body searches with no legal justification.200
A federal regulation from 1953 authorizes Border Patrol to extend
their range of jurisdiction beyond just borders and ports of entry, to
include everything within “100 air miles from any external
194
195
196

197
198

199

200

Id.
Id. at 273.
E.g., Doe v. El Paso Cty. Hosp. Dist., EP-13-CV-406-DB, 2015 WL 11598706,
at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2015) (detailing the extensive scope of the measures
available to search the defendant).
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977).
See Esha Bhandari, The Government’s New Policy on Device Searches at the
Border: What You Need to Know, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/privacy-borders-andcheckpoints/governments-new-policy-device-searches [https://perma.cc/LTV2D2RL] (noting that “searches of electronic devices rose by about 60 percent in
2017 relative to 2016”).
See Sophia Cope, Law Enforcement Uses Border Search Exception as Fourth
Amendment Loophole, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/law-enforcement-uses-border-searchexception-fourth-amendment-loophole [https://perma.cc/DL5L-TAUG].
Susan Ferriss, In Horrifying Detail, Women Accuse U.S. Customs Officers of
Invasive Body Searches, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://wapo.st/2kD6V6O [https://perma.cc/6754-7FPT].
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boundary.”201 As a result of interpreting “external boundary” to include
oceans and all other waterways, the entire eastern seaboard is covered,
along with most of California, the most highly populated areas of
Oregon and Washington, the entire states of Florida and Michigan,
many of the northeastern states, and most of the nation’s other large
cities.202 Such a wide-ranging authority undoubtedly implicates many
individuals’ rights considering that approximately 200 million people—
over 65% of the U.S. population—live within the “100-mile zone.”203
In addition to regular operations at the border and ports of entry, CBP
operates approximately 32 permanent interior border checkpoints
throughout the country, and another 39 temporary internal or “tactical”
checkpoints.204
When a search is conducted at any border or port of entry (including
international airports), searches are allowed even in the absence of any
particularized suspicion.205 At Border Patrol’s internal, non-border
checkpoints, stops and brief questioning may be conducted without
suspicion,206 and more intrusive “secondary inspections” may be
conducted with minimal levels of suspicion.207 In practice, this minimal
standard is rife with abuse. There are many reports of invasive searches
conducted with no articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, some of which
are motivated by race or ethnicity alone.208 Unfortunately, victim
201
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8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2021).
See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Know Your Rights: 100 Mile Border Zone,
ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/border-zone/
[https://perma.cc/9BMC-JB96].
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S (CBP’S)
100 MILE RULE 1 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documen
t/14_9_15_cbp_100-mile_rule_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV8L-ND9J].
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Border Patrol Checkpoints Contribute to
Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance
Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness 8, 34 n.44 (2009),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09824.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD23-RYD9]
(stating that there are 71 total checkpoints, and 39 of them are tactical as of fiscal
year 2008).
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (stops at immigration
checkpoints are permissible insofar as they involve a minimally intrusive “brief
detention of travelers”).
Id. at 560. (these secondary inspections were for “routine and limited inquiry into
residence status”).
See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 12, Sanchez v. U. S.
Office of Border Patrol, No. 12-5378 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2012) (class action
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recourse and agent discipline in the face of misconduct are both virtually
nonexistent.209
These checkpoints often result in the arrest of U.S. citizens at
significantly higher levels than non-citizens.210 In a three-year period,
just one non-citizen immigration apprehension was reported at a

209

210

lawsuit settled by CBP alleged interrogations in Washington were based solely on
race and ethnicity); NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUSTICE DERAILED:
WHAT RAIDS ON NEW YORK’S TRAINS AND BUSES REVEAL ABOUT BORDER
PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 2 (2011), https://www.nyclu.org
/sites/default/files/publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5L4G-FWMM] (reporting complaints of racial profiling);
David Antón Armendáriz, On the Border Patrol and its Use of Illegal Roving
Patrol Stops, 14 SCHOLAR 553 (2012) (discussing and analyzing various instances
and experiences of racial profiling by the Border Patrol); Ron Nixon, Under
Trump, Border Patrol Steps Up Searches Far From the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/us/politics/trump-border-patrolsearches.html [https://perma.cc/3K35-WGDV] (reporting a heightened presence
of CBP officers aboard buses and trains questioning passengers’ immigration
status); Letter from James Lyall, Staff Attorney, ACLU of Arizona, to Charles K.
Edwards, Deputy Inspector General, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and Tamara
Kessler, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan.
15, 2014) (on file with the UMass Law Review) (“Border Patrol continues to rely
on race and ethnicity as factors in subjecting certain motorists to additional
scrutiny and detention at checkpoints.”); Imelda Mejia, Border Patrol Check:
Some Arivaca Residents Want Checkpoint Gone, CRONKITE NEWS (Nov. 20,
2014), http://cronkitenewsonline.com/2014/11/checking-on-the-border-patrolsome-arivaca-residents-want-checkpoint-gone/ [https://perma.cc/VQG3-2Z4H]
(evidence at one checkpoint suggested that vehicles with Latino passengers were
disproportionately likely to be searched); Todd Miller, The US-Mexico Border:
Where the Constitution Goes to Die, MOTHER JONES (July 15, 2014),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/shena-gutierrez-us-mexicoborder-constitution-die/2/ [https://perma.cc/4JFH-99Y7] (of all CBP arrests in
Rochester, New York over four years, “[o]nly 0.9% [had a] fair complexion”).
DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ ET. AL, NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF CBP
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS OF ABUSE 3–5 (2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/No%20
Action%20Taken_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S4G-EPNP]; see also Bob
Ortega, CBP: No Action Against Border Agents in Deadly-Force Cases,
AZCENTRAL (June 7, 2015, 10:16 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/p
olitics/immigration/2015/06/08/cbp-action-agents-deadly-force-cases/28670843/
[https://perma.cc/K4C3-SXDF].
JAMES LYALL ET AL., RECORD OF ABUSE: LAWLESSNESS AND IMPUNITY IN
BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 14 (2015), https://ww
w.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/Record_of_Abuse_101515_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KA2-CSBB].
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checkpoint 75 miles within the border in the Yuma, Arizona sector.211
“[N]ine out of 23 Tucson Sector checkpoints reported zero arrests of
‘deportable subjects’” in 2013,212 while the Yuma sector arrested eight
times as many citizens as non-citizens that year and eleven times as
many in 2011.213 Further, those arrests were primarily for drug
violations and not immigration violations, as all citizens were legally
present in the country.214 In the same time frame, that checkpoint also
received multiple civil rights complaints.215 U.S. citizens are often
subject to search and harassment even when no drugs are present, such
as in Jane Doe v. El Paso Hospital, where one U.S. citizen was detained
at a checkpoint—without a warrant—and was patted down, strip
searched, subjected to a forced and “observed bowel movement, vaginal
and rectal exams, speculum exam, x-ray, and CT scan.”216 Finding
nothing, Border Patrol released the woman without charges.217
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the border search exception
applies only to the narrow purpose of enforcing immigration and
Customs laws, which entails ensuring that required duties are paid on
imported goods and that harmful goods and people do not enter the
country.218 Other potential government interests—including general
crime control—may not be effectuated through the border search
exception. Immigration checkpoints are permissible, according to the
Court, but only insofar as they involve a minimally intrusive “brief
detention of travelers” with a “routine and limited inquiry into residence
status”219 that maintains a primary purpose of immigration
211
212
213
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216
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Id.
Id.
Id.
For example, “four out of five drug-related arrests by Border Patrol involved U.S.
citizens.” Id.
Id.
ACLU Summary of Jane Doe v. El Paso Hospital District, et al, ACLU TEX.,
https://www.aclutx.org/en/cases/jane-doe-v-el-paso-hospital-district-et-al
[https://perma.cc/A7NN-F4AL].
Id.; Doe v. El Paso Cty. Hosp. Dist., EP-13-CV-406-DB, 2015 WL 11598706, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2015).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883–84 (1975).
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 560; see also United States v. MachucaBarrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The scope of an immigration
checkpoint stop is limited to the justifying, programmatic purpose of the stop:
determining the citizenship status of persons passing through the checkpoint.”).
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enforcement.220 Immigration checkpoints may not be operated as drug
checkpoints or focused primarily on broader law enforcement aims like
crime control.221 Such use would be an unconstitutional violation of
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.222
Individual reports and complaints would suggest that each of these
premises and conditions are undermined because in practice, Border
Patrol agents often appear to ignore these limitations in internal nonborder operations. Agents frequently neglect to provide a reason for
conducting a search. When reasons are offered, they often do not rise to
the level of probable cause. Reasons such as a skunk smell emitting from
the vehicle, possession of a backpack, possession of prescription
medication, or a motorist refusing to consent to a search are among those
used by agents to initiate a search.223 Border Patrol enforcement
activities largely appear to be aimed at drug enforcement. Checkpoints
are much more likely to uncover drug offenses—particularly small
amounts of marijuana— than immigration ones, and U.S. citizens are
largely the ones affected.224 The New Hampshire McCarthy case
220

221

222

223
224

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–41 (2000) (a highway
checkpoint violates the Fourth Amendment if its “primary purpose” is drug
interdiction); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (Immigration checkpoints
near the southern U.S. border are permissible only if they involve a “brief
detention of travelers” during which all that is required of the travelers is “a
response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document
evidencing a right to be in the United States.” (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
at 880)).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (“[W]e decline to approve a program whose primary
purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control.”). This primary purpose should include objectives such as gun control,
deterrence of criminal activity, location of suspects, etc., yet this vague standard
may nevertheless serve as a pretense in executing searches. See Jason Fiebig,
Comment, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance from the Supreme Court
Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 618–620 (2010).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (“Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment
would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American life.”).
Letter from James Lyall, supra note 208.
LYALL ET AL., supra note 210, at 3; Nixon, supra note 208; Tanvi Misra, Inside
the Massive U.S. ‘Border Zone,’ BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (May 14, 2018, 08:17
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-14/mapping-wholives-in-border-patrol-s-100-mile-zone [https://perma.cc/95VY-NQUP].
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discussed above is one such example. Drug interdiction appeared to be
the primary focus of that checkpoint; drug dogs were brought in, the
state police were enlisted in advance with the specific purpose of
handling drug cases, and plans were made as to how to efficiently
proceed with the anticipated drug evidence and suspects so that state
police could pursue prosecution. Afterwards, the local police chief
lauded the operation, stating that Border Patrol has “a lot more leeway”
than police do when it comes to constitutional rights, as he would have
needed reasonable suspicion before conducting the drug searches that
took place.225
Indeed, many individuals report being detained, searched, and
questioned about weapons, drugs, even medical history, without being
asked about immigration-related issues or residence status at all.226 In a
forceful dissent in a 1993 Ninth Circuit case, Judge Kozinski noted the
significance of the fact that “[f]ifty million vehicles a year pass through”
just two Border Patrol checkpoints in California.227 The sheer amount
of contraband seized there, combined with the special drug enforcement
training received by agents,228 provided Judge Kozinski with “reason to
suspect the agents working these checkpoints are looking for more than
illegal aliens . . . . [which] turns a legitimate administrative search into
a massive violation of the Fourth Amendment.”229 As such, evidence
suggests “that the Constitution is being routinely violated at these
checkpoints,” as they have been turned “into general law enforcement
checkpoints” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.230
There are a number of troubling accounts of Border Patrol abuses,
including unlawful searches, seizures, and detentions;231 racial
225

226

227

228
229
230
231

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Consolidated Motion to
Suppress at 1, State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, 2018 WL 2106769
(N.H. Super. May 1, 2018).
See, e.g., Letter from James Lyall, supra note 208 (reporting that “ten of the
fifteen individuals” involved in the complaint in question “were never asked about
residence status at all”).
United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1319–20.
See, e.g., Letter from James Lyall, supra note 208 (citing reports where motorists
were told they were detained at checkpoints for reasons such as their car smelling
like a skunk or possessing prescription medications, traveling with a backpack, or
not being recognized by the agent).
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profiling;232 detentions without cause, some of which are lengthy;233 use
of excessive force;234 improper strip searches and sexual assault;235 and
a consistent lack of oversight and accountability in response to such
abuses, from the lowest to the highest levels of agency authority.236
These accounts suggest that Border Patrol agents largely act with
impunity, and disciplinary action for even the most egregious of abuses
is virtually nonexistent.237 In the absence of deterrence, there is little
incentive to operate within either constitutional constraints or agency
guidelines.
Yet the border search exception is limited and is intended for a
specific and narrow purpose: to permit Customs officials to facilitate
trade, customs, and immigration laws and regulations at the border.238
232
233

234
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See, e.g., sources cited supra note 208.
See, e.g., Letter from James Lyall, supra note 208 (describing multiple detentions
lasting 10–45 minutes and “over an hour”); NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
supra note 208, at 6, 7, 20, 22 (discussing detentions ranging from 45 minutes,
“hours” to “a few hours,” to “several days”).
LYALL ET AL., supra note 210, at 8.
Nomaan Merchant & Claudia Lauer, Immigrants Face Hurdles to Prove Abuse
by U.S. Agents, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 14, 2018, 11:29 AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/immigrants-face-hurdles-to-prove-abuseby-u-s-agents [https://perma.cc/6XEQ-8ASL].
Id. (noting that one study found that in a five-and-a-half-year period beginning in
2010, there were “84 complaints of coerced sexual contact against [CBP agents]”;
just seven investigations were conducted, and no charges were filed for any). See
also INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, NEGLECT AND ABUSE OF UNACCOMPANIED
IMMIGRANT CHILDREN BY U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 2 (2018);
John Washington, “Kick Ass, Ask Questions Later”: A Border Patrol
Whistleblower Speaks Out About Culture of Abuse Against Migrants, INTERCEPT
(Sept. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/20/border-patrolagent-immigrant-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/TT5B-K9EE] (suggesting that the
internal culture of Border Patrol promotes a “culture of dehumanization” and
impunity which leads to abuse and assault on the part of agents).
Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s
Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG. (Nov.–Dec.
2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-thegreen-monster-112220/ [https://perma.cc/BM9H-RTKJ] (noting that Border
Patrol norms strongly resist the reporting of misconduct); LYALL ET AL., supra
note 210, at 8 (noting that the internal complaint process is dysfunctional and
ineffective, resulting in a consistent lack of accountability for agent misconduct).
About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/H7WD-5MCV] (“CBP takes a comprehensive approach to
border management and control, combining customs, immigration, border
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Even if Border Patrol operations rigidly adhered to the existing
standards and limitations governing their enforcement activities, it does
not follow that a state court in a criminal prosecution unrelated to
customs and immigration may constitutionally admit evidence obtained
pursuant to the limited scope and purpose of the Border Patrol
exception. To do so would amount to a circumvention of not only state
constitutional protections, but the Fourth Amendment as well. The
empirical evidence that Border Patrol routinely violates even the weaker
constitutional restrictions placed on them makes this concern all the
more pressing.
As the New York court held in People v. Esposito, the border search
exception was granted “for a particular purpose; [and] it may not be used
to circumvent” ordinary constitutional restrictions placed on law
enforcement.239 In gathering evidence of general criminal activity,
Border Patrol becomes an agent of the police, thus triggering “the full
panoply of constitutional provisions and curative measures.”240 This is
the case regardless of the federal agent’s intent to act in agency with the
state. The Border Patrol operates under an exception to the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its role in enforcing immigration and customs
laws. But when they exceed the scope of that role by enforcing other
laws, and in places other than the border, the reason for their Fourth
Amendment exception disappears. Using the evidence anyway under
the rationale that Border Patrol is allowed more constitutional leeway
seriously undercuts constitutional protections without justification.
Therefore, the adoption of the reverse silver platter doctrine is especially
concerning when applied to evidence seized by Border Patrol. Indeed,
an overwhelming number of the litigated cases stem from that agency’s
actions.241

239
240
241

People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 863, 865–66 (N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 866.
As discussed, many, if not the majority of the litigated cases, involved evidence
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V. CONCLUSION
In a strong call for protection of both civil liberties and principles of
federalism, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan argued that state
courts should interpret their state constitutions independently, rather
than in lockstep with the high court’s interpretation of the Bill of
Rights.242 A basic premise of federalism is to respect the variation of
specific rights granted by democratically-enacted state constitutions.
Justice Brennan was critical of the reduction in civil liberties protections
provided by federal courts.243 He argued that “one of the strengths of
our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for
the rights of our citizens.”244 In the face of reduced federal protections,
state courts should step up with increased constitutional protections of
their own.245 Indeed, federalism will be “furthered significantly when
state courts thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the
struggle to protect the people of our nation from governmental
intrusions on their freedoms.”246
Allowing state criminal courts to ignore state constitutional rights
detracts from state sovereignty and local control and favors the federal
standard applicable to whatever federal law enforcement agency is
acting—no matter the nature of the divergence from state-guaranteed
rights. The narrower and more short-term desire to convict every
defendant against whom there exists evidence, however obtained,
should not overcome the importance of state autonomy, the rights and
liberties granted citizens, or the long-term deference to principles of
federalism and respect for constitutional rights.
The reverse silver platter doctrine has been addressed by only a
handful of states. Within those states, there is a fairly even split between
those endorsing the doctrine, adopting a conditional version of the
doctrine, and rejecting it altogether. It is clear that state criminal courts
retain the authority to decide whether to accept evidence that was
obtained by federal agents in ways that violate state constitutional
protections. However, the countervailing interests of vindicating
individual rights and civil liberties, federalism, judicial integrity, and
242
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See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
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encouraging proper law enforcement conduct, while discouraging
improper incentives, all support the conclusion that the reverse silver
platter doctrine should be rejected by states outright. In the absence of a
rejection of the doctrine, it is imperative that, at a minimum, states adopt
a conditional reverse silver platter doctrine. The analysis would focus
on an agency relationship between federal and state agencies, and would
prohibit states from collaborating with federal agencies to search
individuals when the searches would otherwise violate state or federal
constitutional protections. Law enforcement cannot be allowed to join
forces in an effort to bypass the restrictions designed to protect the rights
of the people. As it stands, by simply joining with an agency bound by
fewer rules, law enforcement can flout the laws that citizens believe are
protecting them. The risks attendant to this type of operation are even
greater with respect to Border Patrol. That agency is granted such
expansive exceptions to Fourth Amendment search and seizure
requirements that the potential subversion of constitutional rights
implicates federal as well as state rights. The states maintain a strong
interest in upholding and safeguarding their respective constitutional
provisions. By accepting reverse silver platter evidence, states sacrifice
these principles and the rights of their own citizens in the interest of
prosecutorial convenience and increased convictions. That is too high a
price to pay.

